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ABSTRACT. This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where
players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games
and inmodelswith social interactions as it represents correlated information and homophily,
respectively. Our approach is fully nonparametric in the joint distribution of types and the
strategic effects in the payoffs. First, under monotone pure Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
strategy, we characterize all the restrictions if any on the distribution of players’ choices im-
posed by the game-theoretic model as well as restrictions associated with two assumptions
frequently made in the empirical analysis of discrete games. Namely, we consider exogene-
ity of payoff shifters relative to private information, and mutual independence of private
information given payoff shifters. Second, we study the nonparametric identification of the
payoff functions and types distribution. We show that the model with exogenous payoff
shifters is fully identified up to a single location–scale normalization under some exclusion
restrictions and rank conditions. Third, we discuss partial identification under weaker con-
ditions and multiple equilibria. Lastly, we briefly point out the implications of our results
for model testing and estimation.
Keywords: Rationalization, Identification, DiscreteGame, Social Interactions, Global Games
JEL: C14, C18, C31, C35, C52, and Z13
Date: Monday 9th July, 2018.
∗We thank Victor Aguirregabiria, Andres Aradillas–Lopez, Emmanuel Guerre, Laurent Mathevet, Bernard
Salanie, Matthew Shum, Steven Stern, Elie Tamer, Xun Tang, Neil Wallace and Nese Yildiz for useful com-
ments. We also thank seminar participants at Pennsylvania State University, Texas A&M University, Univer-
sity of Chicago, Brown University, University of Texas at Austin, Columbia University, Rice University, New
York University, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, and University of Toronto, as well as at Texas
Metrics Camp 2013, the 2013 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society at University of
Southern California, and the 2013 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society at National University of Singa-
pore. The second and third authors respectively acknowledge financial supports from the National Science
Foundation through grant SES 1148149 and the Summer Research Fellowship of University of Texas.
⋆School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China, nliu@shufe.edu.cn.
†(corresponding author) Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6FL, New York,
NY, 10012, qvuong@nyu.edu.
‡Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, h.xu@austin.utexas.edu.
1
1. INTRODUCTION
Many economic problems are naturally modeled as games of incomplete information
(see Morris and Shin, 2003). Over the last decades, such games have been much successful
for understanding the strategic interactions among agents in various economic and social
situations. A leading example is auctions with e.g. Vickrey (1961), Riley and Samuelson
(1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the theoretical side, and Porter (1995), Guerre et al.
(2000) and Athey and Haile (2002) for the empirical component. In this paper, we study
the identification of static binary games of incomplete information where players have cor-
related types.1 We characterize all the restrictions if any imposed by such games on the ob-
servables, which are the players’ choice probabilities. Following thework by Laffont and Vuong
(1996) and Athey and Haile (2007) for auctions, our approach is fully nonparametric.
The empirical analysis of static discrete games is almost thirty years old. The range of ap-
plications includes labor force participation (e.g. Bjorn and Vuong, 1984, 1985; Kooreman,
1994; Soetevent and Kooreman, 2007), firms’ entry decisions (e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss, 1990,
1991; Berry, 1992; Tamer, 2003; Berry and Tamer, 2006; Jia, 2008; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009),
and social interactions (e.g. Kline, 2015). These papers deal with discrete games under com-
plete information. More recently, discrete games under incomplete information have been
used to analyze social interactions by Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2007) and Xu (2011) among
others, firm entry and location choices by Seim (2006), timing choices of radio stations
commercials by Sweeting (2009), stock market analysts’ recommendations by Bajari et al.
(2010), capital investment strategies by Aradillas-Lopez (2010) and local grocery markets
by Grieco (2014). This list is far from being exhaustive and does not mention the growing
literature on estimating dynamic games.
Our paper contributes to this literature in several aspects. First, we focus on monotone
pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) throughout to bridge discrete game model-
ing with empirical analysis. Monotonicity is a desirable property in many applications for
both theoretical and empirical reasons. For instance, White et al. (2014) show that mono-
tone strategies are neverworse off than non–monotone strategies in a private value auction
1Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi (2014) study identification and estimation of ordered response games with inde-
pendent types.
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model. On theoretical grounds, Athey (2001) provides seminal results on the existence of a
monotone pure strategy BNEwhenever a Bayesian game obeys the Spence–Mirlees single–
crossing restriction. Relying on the powerful notion of contractibility, Reny (2011) extends
Athey’s results and related results by McAdams (2003) to give weaker conditions ensur-
ing the existence of a monotone pure strategy BNE. Using Reny’s results, we establish
the existence of a monotone pure strategy BNE under a weak monotonicity condition on
the expected payoff in our setting. This condition is satisfied in most models used in the
recent literature. For instance, in empirical IO, it is satisfied when the types are condi-
tionally independent given payoff shifters. In social interaction games, it is also satisfied
with strategic complement payoffs and positively regression dependent types. Exceptions
include Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008); Xu (2014). In our analysis, the importance of us-
ing monotone pure strategy BNEs lies in the fact that we can exploit (weak) monotonicity
between observed actions and underlying types to identify nonparametrically the under-
lying game structure. This opens up the possibility of bringing some theoretical models
such as global games (see e.g. Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998) and
models with social interactions (see e.g. Galeotti et al., 2010) to nonparametric statistical
inference.
Second, we allow players’ private information/types to be correlated. In finance and
macroeconomics applications of global games (e.g. bank runs, currency crises, and bub-
bles; see Morris and Shin, 2003), private information are naturally positively correlated.
See e.g. Carlsson and Van Damme (1993); Morris and Shin (1998). In oligopoly entry, cor-
relation among types allows us to know “whether entry occurs because of unobserved
profitability that is independent of the competition effect” (Berry and Tamer, 2006). In So-
ciology, correlation among players’ types is crucial as it represents the “Homophily” phe-
nomenon, which is the principle that people involved in interactions tend to be similar; see
e.g. McPherson et al. (2001); Easley and Kleinberg (2010). The recognition of homophily in
sociology has a long history: In the writings of Plato, for example, “similarity begets friend-
ship” in his Phaedrus (360 BC). The homophily principle leads to friendship between peo-
ple with similar demographics (age, race, education, etc) and with positively correlated
types (taste, attitudes, etc). The former can be directly observed from the data and has
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been well documented in empirical sociology. Identifying the latter is more challenging as
it is unobserved to the researcher. It is worth pointing out that peer effects and homophily
provide two complementary explanations for the common observation that friends tend
to behave similarly.2 Both of them can be separately identified in our framework.
In contrast, mutual independence of private information has been widely assumed in
the empirical game literature. See, e.g., Brock and Durlauf (2001); Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler
(2003); Seim (2006); Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007); Sweeting (2009); Bajari et al. (2010);
Tang (2010); De Paula and Tang (2012); Lewbel and Tang (2015). To our knowledge, the
only exceptions are Aradillas-Lopez (2010), Wan and Xu (2014) and Xu (2014). Such an
independence of types is a convenient assumption, but imposes strong restrictions such
as the mutual independence of players’ choices given covariates, a property that is often
invalidated by the data.3 On the other hand, when private information is correlated, the
BNE solution concept requires that each player’s beliefs about rivals’ choices depend on
her private information, thereby invalidating the usual two–step identification argument
and estimation procedure, see, e.g., Bajari et al. (2010). With such type–dependent beliefs,
Wan and Xu (2014) establish some upper/lower bounds for the beliefs in a semiparametric
setting with linear–index payoffs. Alternatively, Aradillas-Lopez (2010) adopts a different
equilibrium concept related to Aumann (1987), in which each player’s equilibrium beliefs
do not rely on her private information, but on her actual action.
Third, our analysis is fully nonparametric in the sense that players’ payoffs and the
joint distribution of players’ private information are subject to some mild smoothness con-
ditions only. As far as we know, with the exception of De Paula and Tang (2012) and
Lewbel and Tang (2015), every paper analyzing empirical discrete games has imposed
parametric restrictions on the payoffs and/or the distribution of private information. For
instance, Brock and Durlauf (2001); Seim (2006); Sweeting (2009) and Xu (2014) specify
both payoffs and the private information distribution parametrically. In a semiparametric
context, Aradillas-Lopez (2010); Tang (2010) and Wan and Xu (2014) parameterize players’
2In a linear social interaction model, Manski (1993) denotes them as endogenous effects and correlated effects,
respectively.
3A model with unobserved heterogeneity and independent private information also generates dependence
among players’ choices conditional on covariates (see e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Grieco, 2014). See
also Section 5.4.
4
payoffs, while Bajari et al. (2010) parameterize the distribution of private information. On
the other hand, De Paula and Tang (2012) and Lewbel and Tang (2015) do not introduce
any parameter but impose some restrictions on the payoffs’ functional form. In particular,
they imposemultiplicative separability in the strategic effect and assume that it is a known
function (e.g. sum) of the other players’ choices. In a fully nonparametric setting, our base-
line discrete game model is the most general one and closest to that considered in game
theory. We show that such a model imposes essentially no restrictions on the distribution
of players’ choices. In other words, monotone pure strategy BNEs can explain almost all
observed choice probabilities in discrete games.
In view of the preceding result, we consider the identification power and model restric-
tions associated with two assumptions that are frequently made in the empirical analysis
of discrete games. First, we consider the exogeneity of variables shifting players’ payoffs
relative to players’ private information, an assumption that has been frequently imposed
in recent empirical work, e.g., Brock and Durlauf (2001); Seim (2006); Sweeting (2009);
Aradillas-Lopez (2010); Bajari et al. (2010); De Paula and Tang (2012) and Lewbel and Tang
(2015). We show that the resulting model restricts the distribution of players’ choices con-
ditional upon payoff shifters and we characterize all those restrictions. Specifically, the
exogeneity assumption restricts the joint choice probability to be a monotone function of
the corresponding marginal choice probabilities. Given the exogeneity assumption, we
show that one can identify the equilibrium belief of the player at the margin under a mild
support condition. We then characterize the partially identified set of payoffs and the
distribution of private information under the exogeneity assumption and the support con-
dition. The partially identified region is unbounded and quite large unless one imposes
additional restrictions on the payoffs’ functional form.
To achieve point identification, we consider some exclusion restrictions and rank condi-
tions. We show that the copula function of the types’ distribution is identified on an ap-
propriate support. Then, the players’ payoffs are identified up to scale for each fixed value
of the exogenous state variables, as well as up to the marginal distributions of players’
private information. Moreover, with a single location–scale normalization on the payoff
5
function, we show that both the players’ payoffs and distribution of types are fully iden-
tified. Our model can be viewed as an extension to a game theoretic setting of traditional
threshold–crossing models considered by, e.g., Matzkin (1992). An important difference
is that the game setting allows us to exploit exclusion restrictions to achieve nonparamet-
ric identification of the distribution of errors. Such restrictions are frequently used in the
empirical analysis of discrete games. See, e.g., Aradillas-Lopez (2010); Bajari et al. (2010);
Lewbel and Tang (2015) and Wan and Xu (2014).
For completeness, we consider a second assumption, namely the mutual independence
of players’ private information given payoff shifters. Specifically, we characterize all the
restrictions imposed by exogeneity and mutual independence as considered almost exclu-
sively in the empirical game literature. We show that all the restrictions under this pair
of assumptions can be summarized by the conditional mutual independence of players’
choices given the payoff shifters. In particular, we show that the restrictions imposed by
mutual independence are stronger than those imposed by exogeneity and monotonicity
of the equilibrium. In other words, any of the latter becomes redundant in terms of ex-
plaining players’ choices as soon as mutual independence and a single equilibrium are
imposed.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce our baseline model in Section 2. We
define and establish the existence of a monotone pure strategy BNE. In Section 3, we study
the restrictions imposed by the baseline model. We also derive all the restrictions imposed
by the exogeneity and mutual independence assumptions. In Section 4, we establish the
nonparametric identification of the model primitives under some exclusion restrictions
and rank conditions. In Section 5, we study the partial identification of the payoffs with-
out exclusion restrictions. We also discuss three related issues: nonparametric estimation,
multiple equilibria in the DGP, and unobserved heterogeneity. Section 6 concludes with a
brief discussion on testing the model restrictions.
2. MODEL AND MONOTONE PURE STRATEGY BNE
We consider a discrete game of incomplete information. There is a finite number of
players, indexed by i = 1, 2, · · · , I. Each player simultaneously chooses a binary action
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Yi ∈ {0, 1}. Let Y = (Y1, · · · ,YI) be an action profile andA = {0, 1}I be the space of action
profiles. Following standard convention, let Y−i and A−i denote an action profile of all
players except i and the corresponding action profile space, respectively. Let X ∈ SX ⊂ Rd
be a vector of payoff relevant variables, which are publicly observed by all players and also
by the researcher.4 For instance, X can include individual characteristics of the players as
well as specific variables for the game environment. For each player i, we further assume
that the error term Ui ∈ R is her private information, i.e., Ui is observed only by player i,
but not by other players. To be consistent with the game theoretic literature, we also call
Ui the player i’s “type” (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Let U = (U1, · · · ,UI) and
FU|X be the conditional distribution function of U given X. The conditional distribution
FU|X is assumed to be common knowledge.
The payoff of player i is described as follows:
Πi(Y,X,Ui) =
 πi(Y−i,X)−Ui, if Yi = 1,0, if Yi = 0,
where πi is a structural function of interest. The zero payoff for action Yi = 0 is a standard
payoff normalization in binary response models.5
Following the literature on Bayesian games, given the public state variable X, player i’s
decision rule is a function of her type:
Yi = δi(X,Ui),
where δi : Rd ×R → {0, 1} maps all the information she knows to a binary decision. For
any given strategy profile δ = (δ1, · · · , δI), let σδ−i(a−i|x, ui) be the conditional probability
4See Section 5.4 on unobserved heterogeneity when this is not the case. See also Grieco (2014) who analyzes
a discrete game that has some payoff relevant variables publicly observed by all players, but not by the re-
searcher.
5Here we understand “normalization” from the view of observational equivalence: Suppose the payoffs take
the general form:
Πi(Y,X,U
∗
i0,U
∗
i1) =
{
π∗i1(Y−i,X)−U∗i1, if Yi = 1;
π∗i0(Y−i,X)−U∗i0, if Yi = 0,
where for y = 0, 1, U∗iy and π
∗
iy are action–specific error terms and payoff functions, respectively. It can be
shown that this model with our subsequent assumptions is observationally equivalent to the above game
with payoff πi(Y−i,X) = π∗i1(Y−i,X)− π∗i0(Y−i,X) and Ui = U∗i1 −U∗i0.
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of other players choosing a−i ∈ A−i given X = x and Ui = ui, i.e.,
σδ−i(a−i|x, ui) ≡ Pδ (Y−i = a−i|X = x,Ui = ui) = P
[
δj(X,Uj) = aj, ∀j 6= i|X = x,Ui = ui
]
,
where Pδ represents the (conditional) probability measure under the strategy profile δ.
The equilibrium concept we adopt is the pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
Mixed strategy equilibria are not considered in this paper, since a pure strategy BNE gen-
erally exists under weak conditions in our model.
We now characterize the equilibrium solution in our discrete game. Fix X = x ∈ SX.
In equilibrium, player i with Ui = ui chooses action 1 if and only if her expected payoff is
greater than zero, i.e.,
δ∗i (x, ui) = 1
[
∑
a−i
πi(a−i, x)× σ∗−i(a−i|x, ui)− ui ≥ 0
]
, ∀ i, (1)
where δ∗ ≡ (δ∗1 , · · · , δ∗I ), as a profile of functions of u1, · · · , uI respectively, denotes the
equilibrium strategy profile and σ∗−i(a−i|x, ui) is a shorthand notation for σδ
∗
−i(a−i|x, ui).
Note that σ∗−i depends on δ
∗
−i. Hence, (1) for i = 1, · · · , I defines a simultaneous equation
system in δ∗ referred as “mutual consistency” of players’ optimal behaviors. A pure strat-
egy BNE is a fixed point δ∗ of such a system, which holds for all u = (u1, . . . , uI) in the
supportSU|X=x. Ensuring equilibrium existence in Bayesian games is a complex and deep
subject in the literature. It is well known that a solution of such an equilibrium generally
exists in a broad class of Bayesian games (see, e.g., Vives, 1990).
The key to our approach is to employ a particular equilibrium solution concept of BNE
—monotone pure strategy BNEs, which exist under additional weak conditions. Recently,
much attention has focused on monotone pure strategy BNEs. The reason is that mono-
tonicity is a natural property and has proven to be powerful in many applications such as
auctions, entry, and global games. In our setting, a monotone pure strategy BNE is defined
as follows:
Definition 1. Fix x ∈ SX. A pure strategy profile (δ∗1 (x, ·), · · · , δ∗I (x, ·)) is a monotone pure
strategy BNE if (δ∗1(x, ·), · · · , δ∗I (x, ·)) is a BNE and δ∗i (x, ui) is (weakly) monotone in ui for all i.
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Monotone pure strategy BNEs are relatively easier to characterize than ordinary BNEs.
Fix X = x. In our setting, a monotone pure strategy (m.p.s.) can be explicitly defined as a
threshold function (recall that δ∗i can take only binary values). Formally, in an m.p.s. BNE,
player i’s equilibrium strategy can be written as δ∗i = 1 [ui ≤ u∗i (x)],6 where u∗i (x) is the
cutoff value that might depend on x. Let u∗(x) ≡ (u∗1(x), · · · , u∗I (x)) ∈ RI be the profile of
equilibrium strategy thresholds.
In an m.p.s. BNE, the mutual consistency condition for a BNE solution defined by (1)
requires that for each player i,
ui ≤ u∗i (x)⇐⇒ ∑
a−i
πi(a−i, x)× σ∗−i(a−i|x, ui)− ui ≥ 0. (2)
A simple but key observation is that under certain weak conditions introduced later, (2)
implies that player i with the marginal type u∗i (x) should be indifferent between action 1
and 0, i.e.
∑a−iπi(a−i, x)× σ
∗
−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x))− u∗i (x) = 0. (3)
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy can be represented by
Yi = 1
[
Ui ≤ ∑
a−i
πi(a−i,X)× σ∗−i(a−i|X, u∗i (X))
]
. (4)
The seminal work on the existence of an m.p.s. BNE in games of incomplete information
was first provided by Athey (2001) in both supermodular and logsupermodular games, and
later extended by McAdams (2003) and Reny (2011). Applying Reny (2011) Theorem 4.1,
we establish the existence of m.p.s. BNEs in our binary game under some weak regularity
assumptions.
Assumption R (Conditional Radon–Nikodym Density). For every x ∈ SX, the conditional
distribution of U given X = x is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue measure and has a contin-
uous positive conditional Radon–Nikodym density fU|X(·|x) a.e. over the nonempty interior of its
hypercube support SU|X=x.
6The left–continuity of strategies considered hereafter is not restrictive given our assumptions below. Note
that the payoff function is decreasing in ui, hence the m.p.s. is also (weakly) decreasing. To simplify, through-
out we use “weakly/strictly monotone” to refer to “weakly/strictly decreasing”.
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Assumption R allows the support of U conditional on X = x to be bounded, namely of
the form ×i=1,...,I [ui(x), ui(x)] for some finite endpoints ui(x) and ui(x) as frequently used
when Ui is i’s private information, or unbounded such as when SU|X=x = RI in binary
response models. As a matter of fact, assumption R can be greatly weakened as shown by
Reny (2011) (see Appendix B.2 for more details).
For any strategy profile δ, let Eδ denote the (conditional) expectation under the strategy
profile δ. Without causing any confusion, we will suppress the subscript δ∗ in Eδ∗ (or Pδ∗)
when the expectation (or probability) is taken under the equilibrium strategy profile.
AssumptionM (Monotone Expected Payoff). For any weakly m.p.s. profile δ and x ∈ SX, the
(conditional) expected payoff Eδ
[
πi(Y−i,X)
∣∣X = x,Ui = ui]− ui is a weakly monotone function
in ui ∈ SUi|X=x.
Assumption M guarantees that each player’s best response is also weakly monotone in
type given that all other players adopt weakly m.p.s.. In particular, in a two–player game
(i.e., I = 2), assumption M is equivalent to the following condition: for any x ∈ SX and
u−i ∈ R, the function [πi(1, x)− πi(0, x)] × P(U−i ≤ u−i|X = x,Ui = ui)− ui is weakly
monotone in ui.
Note that for the existence of m.p.s. BNEs, assumption M is sufficient but not necessary
in many cases. It should also be noted that assumption M holds trivially if all Uis are con-
ditionally independent of each other given X. Lemma 6 in Appendix A.2 also provides
primitive sufficient conditions for assumption M. Specifically, we assume positive regres-
sion dependence across Uis given X and strategic complementarity of players’ actions,
which are natural restrictions in models with social interactions.
Lemma 1. Suppose assumptions R and M hold. For any x ∈ SX , there exists an m.p.s. BNE. In
particular, player i’s equilibrium strategy can be written as in (4).
Proof. See Appendix A.1 
By Lemma 1, m.p.s. BNEs generally exist in a large class of binary games. As far as we
know, with the only exception of Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) and Xu (2014), every
paper analyzing empirical discrete games of incomplete information so far has imposed
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certain restrictions (i.e. sufficient conditions for assumption M) to guarantee that equilib-
rium strategies be threshold–crossing.
Monotone pure strategy BNEs are convenient and powerful for empirical analysis. In
particular, we can represent each player’s equilibrium strategy by a semi–linear–index bi-
nary response model (4). Such a representation relates to single-agent binary threshold
crossing models studied by e.g. Matzkin (1992), where the ‘coefficients’ are the player’s
equilibrium belief about the other players’ actions evaluated at the player’s equilibrium
signal threshold u∗i (x). Note, however, that we do not restrict either πi(a−i,X) or FU|X to
have a specific functional form. Nevertheless, in Section 4.2 we will show that the equilib-
rium beliefs σ∗−i in (4) can be nonparametrically identified under additional weak condi-
tions.
Thoughnon–monotone strategyBNEs are seldom considered in the literature, it is worth
pointing out that this kind of equilibria could exist and sometimes even stands as the only
type of equilibria. This could happenwhen some player is quite sensitive to others’ choices
and types are highly correlated. We provide a simple example to illustrate.7
Example 1. Let I = 2 and πi = Xi − βiY−i − Ui, where (U1,U2) conforms to a joint normal
distribution with mean zero, unit variances and correlation parameter ρ ∈ (−1, 1).8
Case 1: Suppose (X1,X2) = (1, 0) and (β1, β2) = (2, 0). Then, regardless of the value of ρ,
there is always a unique pure strategy BNE: Clearly, player 2 has a dominant strategy which is
monotone in u2: choosing 1 if and only if u2 ≤ 0. Thus, player 1’s best response must be: choosing
1 if and only if 1− 2Φ(− ρu1√
1−ρ2
)− u1 ≥ 0. Further, it can be shown that player 1’s equilibrium
strategy is not monotone in u1 if and only if ρ ∈
(√
π
2+π , 1).
Case 2: Suppose (X1,X2) = (1, 1) and (β1, β2) = (2, 2). First, note that the m.p.s. profile
{1(u1 ≤ 0); 1(u2 ≤ 0)} is a BNE as long as ρ ∈
(− 1,√ π2+π ]. Moreover, it can be verified that
this equilibrium is the unique BNE if and only if ρ ∈ (− 1, π−22+π ]. When ρ ∈ (π−22+π , 1 ), we can find
two other equilibria of the game: {1(u1 ≤ u∗); 1(u2 ≤ −u∗)} and {1(u1 ≤ −u∗); 1(u2 ≤ u∗)}
where u∗ > 0 solves 1− 2Φ(
√
1+ρ
1−ρ · u∗) + u∗ = 0.
7We thank Steven Stern and Elie Tamer for their comments and suggestions on the following example.
8In a similar fully parametric setting, Xu (2014) proposes an inference approach based on first identifying a
subset of the covariate space where the game admits a unique m.p.s. BNE.
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In Case 1, the non–monotone strategy BNE occurs due to the large positive correlation
between U1 and U2 (relative to β1), which violates assumption M. On the other hand, for
any given value of the structural parameters, the existence of a non–monotone strategy
BNE could also depend on the realization of (X1,X2).
3. RATIONALIZATION
In this section, we study the baseline model defined by assumptions R and M as well
as two other models obtained by imposing additional assumptions frequently made in the
empirical game literature. Specifically, we characterize all the restrictions imposed on the
distribution of observables (Y,X) by each of these models.
We say that a conditional distribution FY|X is rationalized by a model if and only if it sat-
isfies all the restrictions of the model. Equivalently, FY|X is rationalized by the model if and
only if there is a structure (not necessarily unique) in the model that generates such a dis-
tribution. In particular, rationalization logically precedes identification as the latter, which
is addressed in Section 4, makes sense only if the observed distribution can be rationalized
by the model under consideration.
An assumption frequently made in the literature, e.g., Brock and Durlauf (2001) and
Bajari et al. (2010), is the exogeneity of the observed state variables X relative to private in-
formationU. To our knowledge, exceptions are De Paula and Tang (2012) andWan and Xu
(2014).
Assumption E (Exogeneity). X and U are independent of each other.9
Another assumption called as mutual independence is also widely used in the literature.
For examples, see an extensive list of references in two recent surveys: Bajari et al. (2010)
and de Paula (2012). Such an independence of types is a convenient theoretical assumption,
which means player i’s private information is uninformative about other players’ types
given X.
Assumption I (Mutual Independence). U1, · · · ,UI are mutually independent conditional on
X.
9Our results can be easily extended to the weaker assumption that X and U are independent from each other
conditional onW, whereW are other observed payoff relevant variables.
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Let S ≡ [π; FU|X], where π = (π1, · · · ,πI). We now consider the following models:
M1 ≡
{
S : Assumptions R and M hold and a single m.p.s. BNE is played
}
,
M2 ≡ {S ∈ M1 : Assumption E holds} ,
M3 ≡ {S ∈ M2 : Assumption I holds} .
Clearly,M1 )M2 )M3.
The last requirement inM1 is not restrictive when the game has a unique equilibrium
which has to be an m.p.s. BNE. In the global game literature, for example, one achieves
uniqueness ofm.p.s. BNE as the information noise gets small. See e.g. Carlsson and Van Damme
(1993) and Morris and Shin (1998). In social interactions, uniqueness of m.p.s. BNE has
also been established in e.g. Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Xu (2011). When there exist
multiple equilibria, we follow part of the literature by assuming that the same equilibrium
is played in the DGP for any given x. See e.g. Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2013) for a survey.
Such an assumption is realistic if the equilibrium selection rule is actually governed by
some game invariant factors, like culture, social norm, etc. See, e.g., de Paula (2012) for a
detailed discussion. Relaxing such a requirement has been addressed in recent work and
will be discussed in Section 5.3.
We introduce some key notation for the following analysis. For any structure S ∈ M1,
let αi(x) ≡ FUi|X(u∗i (x)|x). By monotonicity of the equilibrium strategy, we have αi(x) =
E(Yi|X = x), i.e. αi(x) is player i’s (marginal) probability of choosing action 1 given X =
x. Moreover, for each p = 2, · · · , I, and 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ip ≤ I, let CUi1 ,··· ,Uip |X be the
conditional copula function of (Ui1 , · · · ,Uip) given X, i.e., for any (αi1 , · · · , αip) ∈ [0, 1]p
and x ∈ SX,
CUi1 ,··· ,Uip |X(αi1 , · · · , αip |x) ≡ FUi1 ,··· ,Uip |X
(
F−1Ui1|X
(αi1 |x), · · · , F−1Uip|X(αip |x)
∣∣∣x) .
The next proposition characterizes the collection of distributions of Y given X that can
be rationalized byM1.
Proposition 1. A conditional distribution FY|X is rationalized byM1 if and only if for all x ∈ SX
and a ∈ A, P(Y = a|X = x) = 0 implies that P(Yi = ai|X = x) = 0 for some i.
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Proof. See Appendix B.1 
By Proposition 1,M1 rationalizes all distributions for Y given X that belong to the inte-
rior of the 2I − 1 dimensional simplex, i.e. distributions with strictly positive choice proba-
bilities, since the condition in Proposition 1 is void for such distributions. Specifically, the
distributions that cannot be rationalized byM1 must have P(Y = a|X = x) = 0 for some
a ∈ A, i.e., distributions for which there are “structural zeros.” In other words, our base-
line model M1 imposes no essential restrictions on the distribution of observables. The
distributions that cannot be rationalized byM1 arise because of assumption R. As noted
earlier, one can replace assumption R by Reny (2011)’s weaker conditions, in which case
any distribution for Y given X can be rationalized. See Lemma 7 in Appendix B.2.
We now characterize all the restrictions imposed on FY|X bymodelM2. These additional
restrictions come from assumption E.
Proposition 2. A conditional distribution FY|X rationalized byM1 is also rationalized byM2 if
and only if for each p = 2, · · · , I and 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ip ≤ I,
R1: E
(
∏
p
j=1 Yij
∣∣X) = E(∏pj=1 Yij ∣∣αi1(X), · · · , αip(X)).
R2: E
(
∏
p
j=1 Yij |αi1(X) = ·, · · · , αip(X) = ·
)
is strictly increasing on Sαi1(X),··· ,αip(X) except
at values for which some coordinates are zero.
R3: E
(
∏
p
j=1 Yij |αi1(X) = ·, · · · , αip(X) = ·
)
is continuously differentiable onSαi1 (X),··· ,αip(X).
Proof. See Appendix B.3. 
In Proposition 2, the most stringent restriction is R1, which requires that the joint choice
probability depend on X only through the corresponding marginal choice probabilities.
Under restrictions R1 and R2, the condition α(x) ≥ α(x′) implies that P(Yi1 = 1, · · · ,Yip =
1|X = x) ≥ P(Yi1 = 1, · · · ,Yip = 1|X = x′) for all tuples {i1, · · · , ip}. Moreover, note that
αi(x) is identified by αi(x) = E(Yi|X = x). Therefore, all the restrictions R1–R3 are testable
in principle.10 This is discussed further in the Conclusion.
For completeness, we also study the restrictions on observables imposed byM3, which
makes the additional assumption I. It should be noted that assumptionM is satisfied when
10 If X is discrete, then R3 becomes irrelevant.
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assumption I holds. In other words,
M3 = {S : Assumptions R, E, I hold and a single m.p.s. BNE is played}.
In the literature, several special cases ofM3 have been considered under some parametric
or functional form restrictions, see, e.g., Bajari et al. (2010) and Lewbel and Tang (2015).
Proposition 3. A conditional distribution FY|X can be rationalized byM3 if and only if Y1, · · · ,YI
are conditionally independent given X, i.e. for each p = 2, · · · , I and 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ip ≤ I,
E
(
∏
p
j=1Yij |X
)
= ∏
p
j=1 αij(X).
Proof. See Appendix B.4. 
It is worth pointing out that Propositions 1 to 3 exhaust all possible testable restrictions
as they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizingM1,M2 andM3, re-
spectively. Moreover, their proofs are constructive. Specifically, we construct an I–single–
agent decision structure that rationalizes the given distributions satisfying the correspond-
ing restrictions. This is summarized by the following corollary. For k = 1, 2, 3, let
Msk = {S ∈ Mk : πi(a′−i, x) = πi(a−i, x), ∀a′−i, a−i ∈ A−i, x ∈ SX and i = 1, · · · , I}.
Corollary 1. For k = 1, 2, 3,Mk is observationally equivalent toMsk.
Hence, it is evident that without additional model restrictions beyond the assumptions of
M1 M2, orM3, a discrete Bayesian game model with strict interactions cannot be empir-
ically distinguished from an alternative model with I–single–agent decisions. In contrast,
with exclusion restrictions, Section 4 shows that these two classes of models can be distin-
guished from each other.
It should also be noted that the conditional independence restriction in Proposition 3
implies conditions R1–R3 in Proposition 2, as well as the necessary and sufficient condition
in Proposition 1. The conditional independence of players’ choices given payoffs shifters
characterizingM3 suggests that we can replaceM3 in Proposition 3 with
M′3 ≡ {S : Assumption I holds and a single BNE is played},
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sinceM′3 also implies the conditional independence restriction. In particular,M′3 does not
require the monotonicity of the BNE. BecauseM3 ⊂M′3, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Model M3 imposes the same restrictions on the distribution of observables as M′3,
i.e., both models are observationally equivalent.
This is a surprising result: Assumptions R, M and more importantly exogeneity of the pay-
off shifters (assumption E) become redundant in terms of restrictions on the observables,
as soon asmutual independence of types conditional onX (assumption I) and a single BNE
condition are imposed on the baseline model. Moreover, if we are willing to maintain as-
sumption I, then Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 gives us a test of a single equilibrium being
played, as rejecting the conditional independence of the players’ choices given X indicates
the presence of multiple equilibria. This extends a related result in terms of correlation
obtained by De Paula and Tang (2012) in a partial–linear setting.
4. NONPARAMETRIC IDENTIFICATION
In this section we study the nonparametric identification of the baseline game-theoretic
modelM1, and its special casesM2 andM3. The recent literature has focused on the para-
metric or semiparametric identification of structures in M3, see, e.g., Brock and Durlauf
(2001); Seim (2006); Sweeting (2009); Bajari et al. (2010), and Tang (2010). As far as we
know, Lewbel and Tang (2015) is the only paper that studies the nonparametric identifica-
tion of a submodel ofM3 obtained through additional restrictions on the functional form
of payoffs.
In our context, identification of each model is equivalent to identification of the payoffs
πi, the marginal distribution function FUi|X and the copula function CU|X of the joint dis-
tribution of private information. Let QUi|X be the quantile function of FUi|X. Because the
quantile function is the inverse of the CDF, i.e. QUi|X = F
−1
Ui|X, identification reduces to that
of the triple
[
π; {QUi|X}Ii=1;CU|X
]
. In contrast to single-agent binary threshold crossing
models, we do not require any of such primitives to be parameterized.
We first show thatM1 is not identified in general. ForM2, we first establish the iden-
tification of CU|X and the equilibrium beliefs σ∗−i(·|x, u∗i (x)) under an additional support
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condition. The identification of the copula function CU|X is of particular interest in appli-
cations on social interactions, since it represents homophily among friends. Under some
exclusion restrictions and rank conditions, we then establish the full identification of the
payoff functions π and the quantile functions {QUi|X}Ii=1 up to a single location–and–scale
normalization on the payoffs. Regarding M3, its identification requires slightly weaker
support restrictions than those forM2, though the differences are not essential.
4.1. Nonidentification ofM1. We begin with the most general modelM1.
Proposition 4. M1 is not identified nonparametrically.
The proof is trivial. It follows directly from the observational equivalence between any
structure S in M1 and a collection of I–single-agent binary responses models: Let S˜ ≡(
π˜; F˜U|X
)
, in which π˜i(·, x) ≡ u˜i(x), where u˜i(x) is arbitrarily chosen, and F˜U|X satisfies
assumption Rwith F˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip |X(u˜i1(x), · · · , u˜ip(x)|x) = FUi1 ,··· ,Uip |X(u
∗
i1
(x), · · · , u∗ip(x)|x) for
all x ∈ SX and all tuples {i1, · · · , ip}. Thus, S˜ and S are observationally equivalent thereby
establishing the non–identification ofM1.11
Next, we turn to the identification of M2 and its sub–model M3. First note that we
maintain assumption E in both models, i.e. that X and U are independent of each other;
see footnote 9 for a weaker assumption. It follows that QUi|X = QUi and CU|X = CU. Thus,
identification of these models reduces to that of the triple
[
π; {QUi}Ii=1;CU
]
.
4.2. Identification of M2. Let α(x) ≡ (α1(x), · · · , αI(x)) be a profile of the marginal
choice probabilities. Note that αi(x) is identified by E(Yi|X = x). Under assumption E, the
copula function CU is nonparametrically identified on an appropriate domain, namely, the
extended support of α(X) defined asS e
α(X)
≡ {α : αj = 0 for some j}⋃ {α : (αi1 , · · · , αip) ∈
11Even if we impose the identifying restrictions (namely the exclusion restriction, support condition and rank
condition) introduced later,M1 is still not identified by a similar argument.
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Sαi1(X),··· ,αip(X); other αij = 1
}
. We have CU(α) = 0 if αj = 0 for some j; otherwise,12
CU(α) = P
{
U1 ≤ QU1(α1), · · · ,UI ≤ QUI (αI)
}
= P
{
Uj ≤ QUj(αj), ∀j ∈ {i : αi 6= 1}
}
= E
{ I
∏
i=1
Yi
∣∣αj(X) = αj, ∀j ∈ {i : αi 6= 1}}. (5)
Key among those conditions for the nonparametric identification of CU is the assumption
that a single m.p.s. BNE is played in the DGP. Such a restriction implies that conditional
on αj(X) = αj, the event Uj ≤ QUj(αj) is equivalent to Yj = 1.
As mentioned above, the equilibrium belief σ∗−i(·|x, u∗i (x)) can also be nonparametri-
cally identified, for which we need a support condition on α(X).
Assumption SC (Support Condition). The support Sα(X) is a convex subset of [0, 1]I with full
dimension, i.e. dim
(
Sα(X)
)
= I.
Assumption SC implies that the relative interior and the interior S ◦α(X) of Sα(X) are equal.
Hence, the dimension of the interior ofSα(X) is I. See e.g. Rockafellar (1997). Therefore, we
can take derivatives in all directions of an arbitrary smooth function defined on S ◦α(X).
13
Moreover, given the identification of α(x), assumption SC is verifiable.
Assumption SC is high level, requiring that the payoff shifters X contain at least one con-
tinuously distributed component. For instance, suppose πi(a−i, x) = πi0(x) + βi ×∑j 6=i aj
where πi0(·) : SX → R, βi ∈ R+ and (U1, · · · ,UI) are positively regression dependent.
Given assumption E, (3) becomes
πi0(x) = u
∗
i (x)− βi ×∑
j 6=i
P(Uj ≤ u∗j (x)|Ui = u∗i (x)), ∀i = 1, · · · , I. (6)
Because u∗i (x) = QUi(αi(x)), the support of (π10(X), · · · ,πI0(X)) can be derived from the
support Sα(x) and the joint distribution of (U1, · · · ,UI). In general, the support condition
SC requires (π10(X), · · · ,πI0(X)) to be continuously distributed on a support with full
dimension. Moreover, the full dimensionality of Sα(X) requires neither exclusion restric-
tions, nor the dimension of X to be larger than or equal to the number of players. To see
12In (5), it is understood that CU(α) = 1 if α = (1, · · · , 1).
13As a matter of fact, for the boundary points, we can take directional derivatives as well.
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this, consider the extreme situation whereSα(X) has full support [0, 1]I . In the above exam-
ple, suppose the dimension of X is one and SX = R. Let (π10(·), · · · ,πI0(·)) : R → R I be
a one–to–one and onto mapping.14 It follows that for any α ∈ [0, 1]I , one can find a value
x ∈ R that satisfies (6) and could induce α(x) = α. On the other hand, suppose the payoffs
satisfy the linear–index specification πi0(x) = x′θi where x ∈ Rk. Then, the full support
of Sα(X) requires that the index profile (X′θ1, · · · ,X′θI) has full support RI . This holds,
for instance, when X contains an I–dimensional sub–vector Xs with full support on R I
conditional on X−s, and the corresponding square submatrix (θs1, · · · , θsI) has full rank. A
similar condition has been considered in Lewbel and Tang (2015) using special regressors.
Lemma 2. Let S ∈ M2. Suppose assumption SC holds. Fix x ∈ S ◦X . Then the equilibrium beliefs
σ∗−i(·|x, u∗i (x)) are identified, namely, for all a−i ∈ A−i,
σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)) =
∂P (Yi = 1;Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α)
∂αi
∣∣∣∣∣
α=α(x)
. (7)
Proof. See Appendix C.1. 
Note that, under assumption I, the probability P (Yi = 1;Y−i = a−i|α(X)) = αi(X) ×
∏j 6=i α
aj
j (X)[1 − αj(X)]1−aj becomes a (known) linear function in αi(X). Thus, we have
σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)) = ∏j 6=i α
aj
j (X)[1 − αj(X)]1−aj , thereby identifying trivially the equilib-
rium beliefs without assumption SC, see, e.g., Bajari et al. (2010).
The intuition for our identification of σ∗−i is acquired from the local–instrumental–variables
method developed in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005): The local variation in player i’s
choice probability αi(X) (after controlling for α−i(X)) provides the identification power for
the conditional choice probability of the other players given that the latent variable is at
the margin. To illustrate this, we use a two–player game.
Example 2. Let S ∈ M2 and I = 2. Note that for any α ∈ [0, 1]2, we have
P(Y1 = 1,Y2 = 1|α(X) = α) = P [U1 ≤ QU1(α1),U2 ≤ QU2(α2)] = CU(α1, α2),
14Following the Cantor–Schroeder–Bernstein Theorem, one can explicitly construct such a mapping. The con-
structed mapping is not homeomorphic due to discontinuity.
19
where the first equality follows from αi(X) = αi being equivalent to u
∗
i (X) = QUi(αi) from the
independence of U and X. Further, we have
∂CU(α1, α2)
∂αi
= P
(
U−i ≤ QU−i(α−i)|Ui = QUi(αi)
)
, (8)
see, e.g., Darsow et al. (1992). Because QUi(αi(x)) = u
∗
i (x), it follows that
∂P(Y1 = 1,Y2 = 1|α(X) = α)
∂αi
∣∣∣
α=α(x)
= P
(
U−i ≤ u∗−i(x)|Ui = u∗i (x)
)
= P (Y−i = 1|X = x,Ui = u∗i (x)) = σ∗−i(1|x, u∗i (x)).
Similarly, we have
∂P(Yi = 1,Y−i = 0|α(X) = α)
∂αi
∣∣∣
α=α(x)
= σ∗−i(0|x, u∗i (x)).
Equation (8) is related to the treatment effect literature, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil (1999,
2005), Carneiro and Lee (2009) and Jun et al. (2011). Taking derivative with respect to the
propensity score identifies the conditional quantile (or conditional expectation) of the treat-
ment effect at the margin. Lemma 2 extends this result to the multivariate case by using
the law of iterated expectation.
We now discuss the identification of π and QUi . Fix X = x such that αi(x) ∈ (0, 1). By
the proof of Lemma 1 and the fact that u∗i (x) = QUi(αi(x)), we can represent the equilib-
rium condition (3) by
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, x)× σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x))− QUi(αi(x)) = 0, (9)
in which σ∗−i is known by Lemma 2. Next, we will exploit (9) for the identification of the
payoffs πi. The idea is to vary σ∗−i(·|x, u∗i (x)) while keeping πi(·, x) fixed, for which we
need the following exclusion restriction.
Assumption ER (Exclusion Restriction). Let X = (X1, · · · ,XI). For all i, a−i and x, we have
πi(a−i, x) = πi(a−i, xi).15
15As a matter of fact, Xis can have some common variables due to homophily. In this case, our results hold by
conditioning on those common variables.
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In the context of discrete games, the identification power of exclusion restrictions was first
demonstrated in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Tamer (2003), and was used by
Bajari et al. (2010) in a semiparametric setting. For instance, in empirical IO, some cost
shifters are included in the payoff of firm i but not in firm j’s, and vice versa.
Under assumption ER, (9) implies that
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi) ·
{
σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x))−E
[
σ∗−i
(
a−i|X, u∗i (X))
)|Xi = xi, αi(X) = αi(x)] } = 0.
For notational simplicity, we denote the random vector σ∗−i (·|X, u∗i (X)) as Σ∗−i(X), a col-
umn vector of dimension 2I−1. Let Σ∗−i(X) ≡ Σ∗−i(X)−E
[
Σ∗−i(X)|Xi, αi(X)
]
andRi(xi) =
E
[
Σ
∗
−i(X)Σ
∗
−i(X)⊤
∣∣Xi = xi]. Given Lemma 2, we treat Σ∗−i(X) and Σ∗−i(X) as observables
hereafter. Note that ι′Σ∗−i(X) = 1 a.s., where ι ≡ (1, · · · , 1)′ ∈ R2
I−1
. It follows that
ι′Σ∗−i(X) = 0. Thus, Σ
∗
−i(X) consists of a vector of linearly dependent variables. Indeed,
the largest possible rank of the matrix Ri(xi) is 2I−1 − 1, which implies there are no strate-
gic interactions in player i’s decision at equilibrium. In the next proposition, we give iden-
tification results for features ofM2.
Lemma 3. Suppose S ∈ M2, and assumptions SC and ER hold. Fix xi ∈ SXi such that
Sαi(X)|Xi=xi
⋂
(0, 1) 6= ∅. If the rank of Ri(xi) is 2I−1 − 1, then Sαi(X)|Xi=xi must be a sin-
gleton {α†i } and πi(·, xi) is identified up to the α†i –quantile of FUi , i.e. πi(·, xi) = QUi(α†i ). If the
rank ofRi(xi) is 2I−1 − 2, then πi(·, xi) is identified up to location and scale that depend on xi, or
equivalently, πi(·, xi)− πi(a0−i, xi) is identified up to scale for arbitrary a0−i ∈ A−i.
Proof. See Appendix C.2. 
Lemma 3 shows that fixing xi, the payoff function πi(·, xi) is identified as a constant, or
identified up to location and scale, where the scale could be negative. In particular, if
Ri(xi) has the largest rank 2I−1 − 1, there are no strategic effects. Such a rank condition
can be achieved when X−i only contains discrete variations. In particular, when I = 2, the
2I−1 − 1 rank of Ri(xi) equals one, and can be achieved if πi(0, xi) = πi(1, xi), and Xj is a
binary variable such that conditional on Xi = xi, Xj induces a single variation in player j’s
(marginal) choice probability.
21
Under an additional assumption (i.e. assumption V below), we identify the existence
of strategic effects. In addition, we can identify the sign of πi(a−i, xi)− πi(a′−i, xi). When
players’ private signals are independent, De Paula and Tang (2012) develop a special ap-
proach for nonparametrically identifying the signs of the strategic effects by exploiting the
identification power ofmultiple equilibria. In contrast, our approach relies on assumptions
E, ER while being applicable when there is only one (m.p.s.) equilibrium.
Assumption V (Variations in Marginal Choice Probabilities). Fix xi ∈ SXi . There exist
α, α′ ∈ Sα(X)|Xi=xi such that 0 < αi 6= α′i < 1 and (αi, α′−i) ∈ Sα(X).
Proposition 5. Suppose S ∈ M2. Fix xi ∈ SXi . Then πi(·, xi) varies on A−i if Sαi(X)|Xi=xi
is not a singleton. Moreover, suppose assumptions SC, ER and V hold. If the rank of Ri(xi) is
2I−1 − 2, then the sign of πi(a−i, xi)− πi(a0−i, xi) is identified for each a−i ∈ A−i.
Proof. See Appendix C.3. 
When assumption V holds, the rank condition in Proposition 5 requires that X−i contain
at least one continuous random variable such that, conditional on Xi = xi and αi(X) = αi,
there are sufficient variations in σ∗−i(·|X, u∗i (X)) by varying X−i. Such a rank condition is
related to Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003) and Bajari et al. (2010) under semipara-
metric settings.
Alternatively, it is worth pointing out that we can identify the payoffs in modelM2 up
to location and scale by using the single–index structure suggested in Lemma 1. To see
this, let πi(a−i, xi) = πi(a−i, xi)− πi(a0−i, xi). Then
E
(
Yi|Xi = xi,Σ∗−i(X) = Σ∗−i(x)
)
= FUi
(
πi
(
a0−i, xi
)
+ ∑
a−i∈A/{a0−i}
πi(a−i, xi)× σ∗−i
(
a−i|x, u∗i (x)
))
. (10)
Similarly to Powell et al. (1989), we can identify πi(·, xi) up to scale by differentiating (10)
with respect to Σ∗−i(x). Thus πi(·, xi) is identified up to scale. This identification strategy
involves an additional support condition on SΣ∗−i(X)|Xi=xi for taking the derivative, i.e.,
conditional on Xi, the random vector Σ∗−i(X) has a convex support with nonempty interior.
See Powell et al. (1989, Assumption 1)
22
To identify the payoffs up to a single location and scale, we introduce a normalization.
Similar to Matzkin (2003), our normalization is imposed on the payoff functions at some
x∗i ∈ SXi .
Assumption N (Payoff Normalization). We set πi
(
a0−i, x
∗
i
)
= 0 and ‖πi(·, x∗i )‖ = 1 for some
x∗i ∈ SXi satisfying (i) assumption V and (ii) the rank ofRi(x∗i ) is 2I−1 − 2.16
Let S ∈ M2. Suppose that assumptions SC, ER and N hold. By Lemma 3, the payoffs
πi(·, x∗i ) is point identified. By (9), QUi is identified on the support Sαi(X)|Xi=x∗i
⋂
(0, 1).
Further, for each xi ∈ SXi , suppose that the rank of Ri(xi) equals 2I−1 − 2, and that
Sαi(X)|Xi=xi
⋂
Sαi(X)|Xi=x∗i
⋂
(0, 1) contains two elements αi, α′i ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 3, πi(·, xi)
is identified up to location and scale. Note that the quantiles QUi(αi) and QUi(α
′
i) are
known since αi, α′i ∈ Sαi(X)|Xi=x∗i
⋂
(0, 1). Therefore, we can determine the location and
scale of πi(·, xi) from the following two equations
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)×E
[
σ∗−i(a−i|X, u∗i (X))|Xi = xi, αi(X) = αi
]
= QUi(αi);
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)×E
[
σ∗−i(a−i|X, u∗i (X))|Xi = xi, αi(X) = α′i
]
= QUi(α
′
i).
Moreover, we can identify QUi on the support Sαi(X)|Xi∈{x∗i ,xi}
⋂
(0, 1). Repeating such an
argument, we can show that πi(·, xi) can be point identified for all xis in a collection, de-
noted as C∞i , while QUi is identified on the support Sαi(X)|Xi∈C∞i
⋂
(0, 1).
Definition 2. Let the subset C∞i in SXi be defined by the following iterative scheme. Let C
0
i =
{x∗i }. Then, for all t ≥ 0, Ct+1i consists of all elements xi ∈ SXi such that at least one of the follow-
ing conditions is satisfied: (i) xi ∈ Cti ; (ii)Ri(xi) has rank 2I−1− 2 and there exists an x′i ∈ Cti such
that Sαi(X)|Xi=xi
⋂
Sαi(X)|Xi=x′i
⋂
(0, 1) contains at least two different elements; and (iii) Ri(xi)
has rank 2I−1 − 1 and there exists an x′i ∈ Cti such that Sαi(X)|Xi=xi ⊆ Sαi(X)|Xi=x′i
⋂
(0, 1).
In view of Lemma 3, condition (ii) in Definition 2 corresponds to the case where there
are strategic effects. This case is the key to effectively expand the collection of xis in an
16W.l.o.g., we set a0−i = (0, · · · , 0) ∈ A−i. Note that ‖πi(·, x∗i ) − πi(a0−i, x∗i )‖ 6= 0 because of the non–
degeneracy of the support Sαi(X)|Xi=x∗i .
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iterative manner by enlarging Sαi(X)|Xi∈Cti to Sαi(X)|Xi∈Ct+1i . Note that to exploit condition
(ii), we implicitly assume that X−i contains at least one continuous random variable.
Proposition 6. Let S ∈ M2. Suppose assumptions SC, ER and N hold. Then πi and QUi are
point identified on the support A−i ×C∞i and Sαi(X)|Xi∈C∞i
⋂
(0, 1), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix C.4 
It is interesting to note that our identification argument does not apply to a nonpara-
metric single–agent binary response model, see e.g. Matzkin (1992).17 This is because the
support Sαi(X)|Xi=x∗i is a singleton in a single–agent binary response model, i.e., we are
always in the case of condition (iii) in Definition 2. In contrast, with interactions and exclu-
sion restrictions, we can exploit variations of X−i while controlling for Xi to identify a set
of quantiles of FUi .
Note that {Cti : t ≥ 1} is an expanding sequence on the support of SXi , which ensures
that the limit C∞i is well defined (and may not be bounded if SXi is unbounded). The
domain and size of C∞i depend on the choice of x
∗
i as well as the variation of Sαi(X)|Xi=xi
across different xis. Regarding the choice of the starting point x∗i , intuitively we should
choose it in a way such that C∞i is the largest. However, it can be shown that for any x
′
i
satisfying assumption N, if x′i ∈ C∞i , then we will end up with the same C∞i ; otherwise x′i
will lead to a non–overlapping set C∞i
′.
The next corollary shows that the above iterative mechanism is not necessary if x∗i pro-
vides the largest variations in player i’s marginal choice probability conditional on Xi.
Assumption N. (iii) Sαi(X)|Xi=xi ⊆ Sαi(X)|Xi=x∗i for all xi ∈ SXi .
AssumptionN-(iii) requires X−i to have sufficient variations conditional on Xi = x∗i , which
is satisfied in various situations. For instance, this is the case when Sαi(X)|Xi=x∗i has full
support [0, 1]. See e.g. Wan and Xu (2014); Lewbel and Tang (2015).
Corollary 3. Let S ∈ M2. Suppose assumptions SC, ER and N (i) to (iii) hold. Then the results
in Proposition 6 hold, where C∞i = {xi ∈ SXi : Rank of Ri(xi) ≥ 2I−1 − 2}.
17In single–agent binary response models, Matzkin (1992) establishes nonparametric identification results un-
der additional model restrictions (e.g., her assumptions W.2, W.4 and G.2).
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There are normalizations other than assumption N. For instance, we can normalize two
quantiles of the marginal distributions. Specifically, for τi1, τi2 ∈ Sαi(X)|Xi=x∗i
⋂
(0, 1), we
can set the quantiles QUi(τi1) and QUi(τi2) at some values, as long as (strict) monotonicity
is satisfied. Proposition 6 still holds. Second, we can use the usual mean/variance normal-
ization in binary variable models. This is possible under a full support condition. Namely,
supposeRi(x∗i ) has rank 2I−1− 2 and (0, 1) ⊆ Sαi(X)|Xi=x∗i . Then we can set E(Ui) = 0 and
Var(Ui) = 1. Specifically, by Lemma 3, πi is identified up to location and scale. Hence, all
the quantiles QUi are identified up to location and scale by (9). The latter are determined
by the mean and variance normalization.
Lastly, we note that given the identification of the joint distribution of types, we might
be interested in some additional structures on the error terms. For instance, suppose the
private signals are affiliated in the sense of Milgrom and Weber (1982) as whenUi = ξ + ǫi
where ξ is a common shock to all players and ǫi are iid (across players) idiosyncratic errors.
Following Li and Vuong (1998), we can further deconvolute the joint distribution FU to
identify the marginal distributions of ξ and ǫi.
4.3. Identification ofM3. Though not our focus of interest,M3 is nonparametrically iden-
tified in general. The argument does not essentially differ from that ofM2: assumption I
only relaxes the support condition for identification of σ∗−i in Lemma 2. We illustrate this
in the next lemma.
Lemma 4. Let S ∈ M3. Fix x ∈ SX. Then σ∗−i(·|x, u∗i (x)) is identified by
σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)) = P (Y−i = a−i|X = x) .
The proof is straightforward, hence omitted. By Proposition 2, we can also show that
σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)) = P (Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α(x)). Similar results can be found in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler
(2003); Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007); Bajari et al. (2010), among others. Further, the iden-
tification of πi and QUi inM3 follows Lemma 3 and Proposition 6 under assumptions ER
and N. In particular, if Sαi(X)|Xi=xi is not a singleton, then the rank condition requires that
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X−i contain at least one continuous random variable to ensure there are sufficient varia-
tions in σ∗−i(·|X, u∗i (X)) conditional on Xi and αi(X) by varying X−i. For a recent contribu-
tion using special regressors, see Lewbel and Tang (2015).
5. DISCUSSION
In this section, we consider four issues related to our identification analysis. First, we
illustrate how to nonparametrically estimateM2 based on the identification strategy estab-
lished in Section 4.2. Second, without assumption ER, we examine the partial identifica-
tion ofM2. Third, we relax the single equilibrium assumption, i.e., we allow for multiple
m.p.s. BNEs in the DGP, under which the observed data is a mixture of distributions from
all these equilibria. Fourth, we discuss the issue of unobserved heterogeneity.
5.1. ASketch ofNonparametric Estimation. To demonstrate how our nonparametric iden-
tification results can be used for estimation, we provide a sketch of a simple estimation
procedure of a structure
[
π; {QUi}Ii=1;CU
]
in M2. A full development of nonparametric
inference is beyond the scope of this paper.
For simplicity, we maintain the conditions in Corollary 3. Suppose the researcher ob-
serves an iid random sample {(X′1,Y′1)′, · · · , (X′n,Y′n)′}, where Xt = (X′1t, · · · ,X′It)′ and
Yt = (Y1t, · · · ,YIt)′ for t = 1, · · · , n. Note that the number of players I is assumed to
be constant for expositional simplicity. Here we suggest a flexible two–stage estimation
procedure using sieve methods.
Step 1: Estimate the copula function CU. For this step, we begin by estimating the mar-
ginal choice probability function αi(·). There are several alternative nonparametric meth-
ods for such a purpose. Here we use sieve methods; see Chen (2007). Let F be a continuous
distribution function with an interval support. For instance, we can choose F = Φ, the
standard Normal distribution. We then estimate αi(·) by αˆi(·) = F(γˆi(·)), where
γˆi = argsupγi∈Γn
1
n
n
∑
t=1
{
Yit log F(γi(Xt)) + (1− Yit) log
[
1− F(γi(Xt))
]}
,
in which Γn is a Ho¨lder class of real valued smooth basis functions mapping SX to R.
The estimation of CU follows eq. (5). Note that with CU and α(X), we can obtain the
conditional choice probability of Y = a for any a ∈ A given X. Let P(Y = a|X) =
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GI(a;CU , α(X)) where GI is a known function depending on I, CU and α(X). For example,
suppose I = 2. We can show that
G2((1, 1);CU, α) = CU(α),
G2((0, 1);CU, α) = CU(1, α2)− CU(α),
G2((1, 0);CU, α) = CU(α1, 1)− CU(α),
G2((0, 0);CU, α) = 1− CU(α1, 1)− CU(1, α2) + CU(α).
Further, let Cn be a Ho¨lder class of “p–smooth” real valued basis functions mapping [0, 1]I
to R for some p > 1, which can approximate any square–integrable function arbitrarily
well. Using the sieve MLE method, we then define our copula estimator by
CˆU = argsupCU∈Cn
1
n
n
∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
1(Yt = a) logGI(a;CU , αˆ(X)).
Consistency and asymptotic distribution of αˆ(·) and CˆU can be obtained from e.g. Chen
(2007).18 As the function estimator CˆU might not be a proper copula, we can modify CˆU
by using a rearrangement approach similar to Chernozhukov et al. (2010b). Care must be
taken given that CU is a multivariate CDF.
Step 2: Estimate the payoff functions πi and quantile functions QUi . Using Lemma 2, we
first estimate the equilibrium beliefs σ∗−i by
σˆ∗−i(a−i|Xt, u∗i (Xt)) =
∂GI((1, a−i); CˆU, α)
∂αi
∣∣
α=αˆ(Xt)
.
Next, we estimate πi and QUi from eq. (9). Suppose QUi ∈ L2(0, 1). Then, for a given
complete orthonormal sequence {ψk, k ≥ 1} in L2(0, 1), we have
QUi(α) =
∞
∑
k=1
q∗k · ψk(α), ∀α ∈ Sαi(X),
where q∗k =
∫ 1
0 ψk(s) · QUi(s)ds. Let Qn =
{
∑
Kn
k=1 qkψk : qk ∈ Qk
}
be a sieve space depend-
ing on the sample size, where Qk ⊂ R is compact. Note that (9) implies that πi is identified
18Alternatively, (5) can be used to propose a kernel regression estimator of the copula with generated regres-
sors αˆ(X). See Mammen, Rothe and Schienle (2012).
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up to QUi , i.e.,
πi(·, xi) =
{
E
[
Σ∗−i(X)Σ
∗′
−i(X)
∣∣Xi = xi]}−1 E [Σ∗−i(X)QUi(αi(X))∣∣Xi = xi] .
Hence, our estimator of QUi is defined as follows:
QˆUi = arginfQUi∈Qn
n
∑
t=1
[
∑
a−i∈A−i
π˜i(a−i,Xit|QUi) · σˆ∗−i(a−i|Xt, u∗i (Xt))−QUi(αˆi(Xt))
]2
s.t. π˜i
(
a0−i, x
∗
i |QUi
)
= 0, and ‖π˜i(·, x∗i |QUi)‖ = 1,
where π˜i(·, ·|QUi) is a functional of QUi = ∑Knk=1 qkψk:
π˜i(·,Xit|QUi)
≡
[
n
∑
s=1
Σˆ∗−i(Xs)Σˆ
∗′
−i(Xs)K
(Xis − Xit
h
)]−1 [ n
∑
s=1
Σˆ∗−i(Xs)QUi(αˆi(Xs))K
(Xis − Xit
h
)]
=
Kn
∑
k=1
qk

[
n
∑
s=1
Σˆ∗−i(Xs)Σˆ
∗′
−i(Xs)K
(Xis − Xit
h
)]−1 [ n
∑
s=1
Σˆ∗−i(Xs)ψk(αˆi(Xs))K
(Xis − Xit
h
)] ,
where K and h are a kernel function and bandwidth, respectively. Then, we let πˆi(·, xi) =
π˜i(·, xi|QˆUi). The proposed estimation procedure is easy to implement. Its precise asymp-
totic properties can be derived using the functional deltamethod in Van Der Vaart and Wellner
(1996). As the quantile function estimator QˆUi might not be strictly increasing, we can use
Chernozhukov et al. (2010a)’s rearrangement approach to modify it, or choose a shape pre-
serving sieve as suggested by e.g. Chen (2007).
5.2. Partial Identification. In this subsection, we study the partial identification of the
game primitives when there are no exclusion restrictions, i.e. when assumption ER does
not hold. It is worth emphasizing that the lack of point identification of a structure here
is not due to multiple equilibria, but to the lack of identifying restrictions, i.e., the exclu-
sion restrictions and the rank conditions. This is similar to, e.g., Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011)
who study partial identification of the average structural function in a triangular model
without imposing a restrictive support condition. When there are multiple m.p.s. BNEs,
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we still maintain the assumption of a single equilibrium being played for generating the
distribution of observables.
By the same argument as for the identification ofM2, the copula function CU is point–
identified on the extended support S e
α(X). Let C be the set of strictly increasing (on (0, 1]
I )
and continuously differentiable copula functions mapping [0, 1]I to [0, 1]. Then, the identi-
fication region of CU can be characterized by
CI =
{
C˜U ∈ C : C˜U(α) = CU(α), ∀α ∈ S eα(X)
}
.
For each C˜U ∈ CI , suppose we set F˜Ui to be the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and π˜i(·, x) =
αi(x). Clearly, the constructed structure
[
π˜; F˜U
]
is observationally equivalent to the under-
lying structure. Thus, CI is the sharp identification region for CU.
Next, we turn to the set identification of the quantile functionQUi . By assumption R,QUi
belongs to the set of strictly increasing and continuously differentiable functions mapping
[0, 1] to R, denoted as Q. The next lemma shows thatM2 imposes no restrictions on QUi
and its identification region is Q.
Lemma 5. Let S ∈ M2. For any (Q˜U1 , · · · , Q˜UI ) ∈ Q I , there exists an observationally equiva-
lent structure S˜ ∈ M2 with the marginal quantile function profile (Q˜U1 , · · · , Q˜UI ).
Proof. See Appendix D.1 
Now we discuss the sharp identification region for πi. Let G be the set of functions
mapping A−i ×SX to R.
Proposition 7. Let S ∈ M2. Suppose assumption SC holds. Then the sharp identification region
is given by
{[
π˜; {Q˜Ui}Ii=1; C˜U
]
: (Q˜Ui , C˜U) ∈ (Q,CI), π˜ ∈ ΘI
({Q˜Ui}Ii=1, C˜U)}, where
ΘI({Q˜Ui}Ii=1, C˜U) ≡
{
π˜ ∈ G I : (a) for all x ∈ SX and i,
Q˜Ui(αi(x)) = ∑
a−i∈A−i
π˜i(a−i, x)× σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)); (b) for any m.p.s. profile δ :
Eδ
[
π˜i (Y−i,X) |X = x,Ui = Q˜Ui(αi)
]
− Q˜Ui(αi) is weakly monotone in αi ∈ (0, 1)
}
.
Proof. See Appendix D.2. 
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In the definition of ΘI , condition (a) requires that πi(·, x) should belong to a hyperplane,
for which the slopes are given by the identified beliefs Σ∗−i(x); condition (b) does not im-
pose much restriction on the structural parameters. Clearly, ΘI is nonempty and convex.19
The identification region is unbounded and quite large. To see this, fix an arbitrary
non–negative function κi(x) ≥ 0. Let ψi : R → R satisfy: (i) ψi is a continuously dif-
ferentiable and strictly increasing function; and (ii) for all x, κi(x)QUi(αi)− ψi(QUi(αi)) is
weakly decreasing in αi ∈ (0, 1). Note that condition (ii) is equivalent to: infui∈SUi ψ′i(ui) ≥
supx∈SX κi(x). Clearly, there are plenty of choices for such a function ψi. Let further Q˜Ui =
ψi(QUi) and π˜i(a−i, x) = ξi(x) + κi(x) × πi(a−i, x), in which ξi(x) = ψi(QUi(αi(x))) −
κi(x)×QUi(αi(x)). Then, it can be verified that the constructed structure [π˜; {Q˜Ui}Ii=1; C˜U
]
belongs to the identified set.20 To narrow down the identification region, additional restric-
tions need to be introduced. Instead of imposing assumption ER, an alternative approach
is to make assumptions on the payoff functional form. For instance, De Paula and Tang
(2012) set πi(a−i, x) = π∗i (x) + gi(a−i) × h∗i (x), where gi is a function known to all play-
ers as well as to the econometrician, and (π∗i , h
∗
i ) are structural parameters in their model.
Then, Proposition 7–(a) becomes: for all x ∈ SX and i,
Q˜Ui(αi(x)) = π˜
∗
i (x) + h˜
∗
i (x)× ∑
a−i∈A−i
gi(a−i)× σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)),
which imposes a linear restriction on π˜∗i (x) and h˜
∗
i (x) by noting that ∑a−i∈A−i gi(a−i) ×
σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)) is identified under the conditions in Lemma 2. Moreover, Proposition 7–
(b) imposes an additional restriction on the copula function C˜U.
19 To see the nonemptiness, we can simply take π˜i(·, x) = Q˜Ui(αi(x)).
20Note that the payoff normalization imposed in Proposition 6 is not helpful to bound the payoffs, since it
applies only at one point x∗i ∈ SXi . Specifically, if one imposes a similar normalization on πi(·, x∗) for some
x∗ ∈ SX , we would need to restrict the monotone mapping ψi to satisfy ψi(αi(x∗)) = α∗i (x)when constructing
an observational equivalence structure. Nevertheless, without assumption ER, the unboundedness of the
partially identified set still holds for all x ∈ SX satisfying αi(x) 6= αi(x∗).
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When Sα(X) = (0, 1)I , CI degenerates to the singleton {CU}. In this case, the sharp iden-
tification region for (π, {QUi}Ii=1) can be characterized in a more straightforward manner:
Θ∗I =
{
(π˜, {Q˜Ui}Ii=1) ∈ G I ×Q I : (a′) for all x ∈ SX and i,
Q˜Ui(αi(x)) = ∑
a−i∈A−i
π˜i(a−i, x)× σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)); (b′) and for all α−i ∈ [0, 1]I−1,
∑
a−i∈A−i
π˜i(a−i, x)× σα−i(a−i, α−i, αi)− Q˜Ui(αi) is weakly monotone in αi ∈ (0, 1)
}
,
where σα−i(a−i, α−i, αi) = PCU (Cj ≤ αj ∀aj = 1;Cj > αj ∀aj = 0|Ci = αi).
5.3. Multiple Equilibria in DGP. The problems raised by multiple equilibria have a long
history in economics. See e.g. Jovanovic (1989) for empirical implications of multiple
equilibria, and Morris and Shin (2001) for a recent discussion in macroeconomic model-
ing. The static games literature have struggled with difficulties arising from equilibrium
multiplicity since the mid 1980s. See e.g. Bjorn and Vuong (1984). Researchers have de-
veloped essentially three approaches. In the first approach, one assumes there is a sin-
gle equilibrium in the DGP as we do. See e.g. Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2013) for a sur-
vey. Sometimes this assumption is satisfied when the model admits a unique equilibrium.
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003) provide empirical justifications for this assump-
tion, in particular, when data come from the same game repeatedly played across different
time periods. See also e.g. Bajari et al. (2010). A more sophisticated solution is to identify
a subset in the support of covariates that admit a unique equilibrium. See Xu (2014) in a
parametric setting.
In the second approach, a seminal paper by Tamer (2003) introduces partial identifica-
tion analysis in a discrete game of complete information. This allows us to bound the
parameters of interest without specifying which equilibrium is chosen. In a parametric
model, Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) obtain inequality constrains by exploiting level–
k rationality in either a complete or incomplete information framework. In a semiparamet-
ric setting with incomplete information, Wan and Xu (2014) develop upper/lower bounds
for equilibrium beliefs to achieve point identification of payoff parameters under a full
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support condition on regressors. In the third approach, one introduce a probability distri-
bution λ over the set of equilibria. See e.g. Bjorn and Vuong (1984); Bajari et al. (2010) for
complete information games, and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) for incomplete informa-
tion games in parametric settings.
In general, the issue of multiple equilibria is a largely unexplored area of research in
a nonparametric framework, which is considered in this paper. We first address how to
detect multiple equilibria in our setting. Next we discuss the problem of identification
in the presence of multiple equilibria. Our discussion below focuses on M2, since M1
imposes almost no restrictions by Proposition 1.21
InM2, we can detect multiple equilibria from the model restrictions derived in Propo-
sition 2, specifically, restrictions R1 and R2. This is because, in the presence of multiple
equilibria in the data, R1 and/or R2 are violated in general. Moreover, if assumption ER
holds, (9) introduces additional model restrictions, providing stronger power to detect the
existence of multiple equilibria. To see this, we first fix Xi = xi. Under assumption ER, (9)
can be rewritten as
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)× σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x))− QUi(αi(x)) = 0, (11)
for all x ∈ SX|Xi=xi . SupposeSαi(X)|Xi=xi is not a singleton. Then, there are strategic effects.
Conditional on αi(X) = αi ∈ Sαi(X)|Xi=xi further, the random vector Σ∗−i(X), which is a
probability mass function on A−i, has to be distributed on a hyperplane in R2I−1 . In addi-
tion, the slope πi(·, xi) of the hyperplane remains constant as αi varies, while its intercept
QUi(αi(x)) strictly increases in αi. Because the equilibrium beliefs σ
∗
−i(·|x, u∗i (x)) are identi-
fied under assumption SC, violations of these restrictions indicate the presence of multiple
equilibria. In the special case of I = 2, these restrictions imply that, conditional on Xi = xi,
αj(x) is a monotone function of αi(x). Violations of such a monotonicity indicates multiple
equilibria.
21In M3 or M′3, multiple equilibria can be detected by testing the conditional independence as shown in
Proposition 3 and corollary 2. See also De Paula and Tang (2012).
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Next, to relax the single equilibrium assumption for identification analysis, we follow
Henry et al. (2014) by introducing an instrumental variable Z, which does not affect play-
ers’ payoffs, the distribution of types, or the set of equilibria in the game, but can effectively
change the equilibrium selection. For each x ∈ SX, let E (x) be the set of m.p.s. BNEs in
the game with X = x. Note that E (x) could be an infinite collection and the number of
equilibria depends on the value of x. To simplify, we assume that players only focus on
a subset Γ(x) of E (x) for the DGP, i.e., the set of equilibria that will be played in the data.
We further assume that the number of elements in Γ(x) is finite and bounded above by a
constant J (J ≥ 2) for all x.
Let λ be a probability distribution {pλ1 , · · · , pλJ } on the support {1, · · · , J} such that the
j–th equilibrium occurs with probability pλj . The distribution λ may have some zero mass
points, which means that the number of equilibria in Γ(x) is strictly less than J. Essen-
tially, λ summarizes the mixture of equilibrium distributions arising from the equilibrium
selection mechanism. Following Henry et al. (2014), we assume that the probability distri-
bution λ varies with X and Z, where Z is a vector of instrumental variables that does not
affect either E (X) or Γ(X), but has influence on the equilibrium selection through λ.
In Henry et al. (2014), it is shown that the set of component distributions is partially
identified in the space of probability distributions. For example, for J = 2, the observed
distribution FY|X=x is a convex combination of the two component distributions generated
from the two equilibria in Γ(x). Then, variations of the instrumental variable Z cause
the mixture distribution to move along a straight line in the function space of probability
distributions. Further, we can point identify the set of distributions corresponding to Γ(x)
if Z has sufficient variations. To see this, w.l.o.g. let J = 2. For each x ∈ SX, suppose
there exist some (unknown) z, z′ ∈ SZ|X=x such that λ = (0, 1) when (X,Z) = (x, z)
and λ = (1, 0) when (X,Z) = (x, z′). In the space of probability distributions, the two
equilibrium distributions can be identified as the two extreme points of the convex hull
(which is a straight line) of the collection of distributions FY|X=x,Z=z for all z ∈ SZ|X=x.
Either one of them represents a probability distribution from a single m.p.s. BNE given
x, which thereafter provides the identification of the underlying game structure as we
discussed in the identification section.
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5.4. Correlated Types vs Unobserved Heterogeneity with Independent Types. Within a
paradigm where private signals are independent unconditionally or conditionally given
X, a known approach for generating correlation among actions given X is to introduce
unobserved heterogeneity. In a fully parametric setting, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)
and Grieco (2014) introduce unobserved heterogeneity through some payoff relevant vari-
ables ζ publicly observed by all players, but not by the researcher. An important question
is whether one can distinguish this model from our model with correlated types. Because
M1 can rationalize any distributions generated by amodel with unobserved heterogeneity
and independent types, we considerM2 below.
Consider the following payoffs with unobserved heterogeneity:
Πi(Y,X, ζ,Ui) =
 πi(Y−i,X, ζ)−Ui, if Yi = 1,0, if Yi = 0,
where ζ is a discrete variable that is unobserved to the researcher. Let the support of ζ
be {z1, · · · , zJ} and pj(x) = P(ζ = zj|X = x). To simplify, we assume there are only
two players with U1⊥U2 and (U1,U2)⊥(X, ζ). We assume further that there is only a
single equilibrium in the DGP for every (x, zj) ∈ SXζ , which is also assumed in our model
M2. Then, the joint choice probability for the model with unobserved heterogeneity and
independent types is
E(Y1Y2|X = x) =
J
∑
j=1
E(Y1Y2|X = x, ζ = zj) · pj(x) =
J
∑
j=1
α1(x, zj) · α2(x, zj) · pj(x)
where αi(x, zj) = E(Yi|X = x, ζ = zj). Moreover, the marginal choice probability is
αi(x) =
J
∑
j=1
αi(x, zj) · pj(x), for i = 1, 2,
where αi(x) = E(Yi|X = x).
We now argue that these joint and marginal choice probabilities can violate restric-
tion R1 in Proposition 2. Specifically, R1 requires that E(Y1Y2|X = x) be a function of
(α1(x), α2(x)) only. The model with unobserved heterogeneity and independent types
does not exclude the possibility that there exist x, x′ ∈ SX such that αi(x) = αi(x′) for
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i = 1, 2, but E(Y1Y2|X = x) 6= E(Y1Y2|X = x′). For instance, suppose J = 2, pj(x) =
pj(x
′) = 0.5 for j = 1, 2, α1(x, z1) = α2(x, z1) = 0.4, α1(x, z2) = α2(x, z2) = 0.6, α1(x′, z1) =
0.3, α2(x′, z1) = 0.7, α1(x′, z2) = 0.7, α2(x′, z2) = 0.3. Therefore, α1(x) = α1(x′) = 0.5 and
α2(x) = α2(x′) = 0.5, but E(Y1Y2|X = x) = 0.26 6= E(Y1Y2|X = x′) = 0.21. Consequently,
the model with unobserved heterogeneity and independent types can be distinguished
from modelM2. We have focused on R1 above, but monotonicity in αi(X) (see R2) could
be violated as well for similar reasons.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the rationalization and identification of discrete games with corre-
lated types within a fully nonparametric framework. Allowing for correlation across types
is important in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents corre-
lated information and homophily, respectively. Regarding rationalization, we show that
our baseline game–theoretical modelM1 with a single m.p.s. BNE in the DGP does not
impose any essential restrictions on observables, and hence is not testable in view of play-
ers’ choice probabilities only. We also show that exogeneity is testable, because R1–R3
in Proposition 2 characterize all the restrictions imposed by exogeneity. For instance, we
can view R1 as a regression of the joint choices on covariates that depends on the latter
only through the marginal choice probabilities. Thus, to test R1 we can extend Fan and Li
(1996) and Lavergne and Vuong (2000) significance tests by allowing for estimation of the
marginal choice probabilities. Moreover, R2 is a monotonicity restriction that can be tested
by testing the convexity of its integral, see e.g., Delgado and Escanciano (2012).22
ModelM3 is mostly adopted in empirical work within a parametric or semiparametric
setting. We show that all its restrictions reduce to the mutual independence of choices con-
ditional on covariates. This can be tested by using conditional independence tests, see e.g.
Su and White (2007, 2008). Moreover, Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 show that the same
restriction characterizes model M′3 which only assumes mutual independence of types
conditional on covariates and a single (not necessary monotone) BNE in the DGP. These
22In the context of finite normal form games, the Quantal Response Equilibrium has an identical structure to
BNE in our setting. In a semiparametric setting, Melo et al. (2014) obtain model restrictions characterized by
monotonicity that are similar to R1, and then propose a moment inequality test.
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two assumptions seem to be unrelated, but actually are two sides of the same coin. Main-
taining a single equilibrium in the DGP, we can use the mutual independence of choices
given covariates to test mutual independence of typeswhich is widely assumed in the liter-
ature. On the other hand, maintaining mutual independence of types, we can use the same
mutual independence of choices to test for a single equilibrium versus multiple equilibria.
See, e.g., De Paula and Tang (2012).
It is worth noting that the above tests do not rely on identification and consequently on
the assumptions used to identify the primitives of the various models. In particular, we
show that modelM2 is identified up to a single location–scale normalization under exclu-
sion restrictions, rank conditions and a non–degenerate support condition. The exclusion
restrictions take the form of excluding part of a player’s payoff shifters from all other play-
ers’ payoffs as frequently assumed in the literature. Specifically, the dependence of players’
joint choices on the marginal choice probabilities identifies the dependence across types,
while the dependence of a player’s marginal choice probabilities on her equilibrium beliefs
identifies her payoffs. Without exclusion restrictions, we show that the sharp identification
region of players’ payoffs is unbounded.
Our identification results are useful for estimation of global games and social interaction
models. In a semiparametric setup, Liu and Xu (2012) propose an estimation procedure for
ourmodelM2 with linear payoffs, and establish the root–n consistency of the linear payoff
coefficients. A fully nonparametric estimation deserves to be studied following the estima-
tion sketch given in Section 5.1. Specifically, we could rely on the identification results and
propose sample–analog estimators for the players’ payoffs and the joint distribution of pri-
vate information. The equilibrium condition (9) is the key estimating equation. It has the
nice feature to be partially linear, namely, linear in the payoffs and nonparametric in the
quantile. A difficulty is to take into account the estimation of the beliefs of the player at
the margin and the marginal choice probabilities. Part of the problem could be addressed
by using the recent literature on nonparametric regression with generated covariates, see
e.g. Mammen et al. (2012). An important question is to determine the optimal (best) rate
at which the primitives ofM2 can be estimated from players’ choices. Proposition 2 which
characterizes all the restrictions imposed byM2 will be useful, see e.g. Guerre et al. (2000).
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APPENDIX A. EXISTENCE OF M.P.S. BNES
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1. First, we show the existence of m.p.s. BNE. Assumptions G1–G6 of Reny
(2011) are satisfied in our discrete game under assumption R. Moreover, by assumption M, when
other players employ m.p.s., player i’s best response is also a joint–closed set of m.p.s.. By Reny
(2011, Theorem 4.1), the conclusion follows.
We now show the second half. Fix X = x. Because σ∗−i(a−i|x, ui) are continuous in ui under
assumption R, then ∑a−iπi(a−i, x)σ
∗
−i(a−i|x, ui)− ui is a continuously decreasing function in ui.
Suppose ui(x) < u
∗
i (x) < ui(x). It follows that
∑a−iπi(a−i, x)σ
∗
−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x))− u∗i (x) = 0.
Hence, conditional on ui(X) < u
∗
i (X) < ui(X), we have
Yi = 1 [Ui ≤ u∗i (X)] = 1
[
Ui ≤ ∑
a−i
πi(a−i,X)σ∗−i
(
a−i|X, u∗i (X)
)]
.
Suppose u∗i (x) = ui(x). Then ∑a−iπi(a−i, x)σ
∗
−i(a−i|x, ui(x)) − ui(x) ≥ 0, which implies that
conditional on u∗i (X) = ui(X), there is
Yi = 1 [Ui ≤ ui(X)] ≤ 1
[
Ui ≤ ∑
a−i
πi(a−i,X)σ∗−i
(
a−i|X, ui(X)
)]
.
Because 1 [Ui ≤ ui(X)] = 1 a.s., thus
Yi = 1 [Ui ≤ ui(X)] = 1
[
Ui ≤ ∑
a−i
πi(a−i,X)σ∗−i
(
a−i|X, ui(X)
)]
a.s.
Similar arguments hold for the case u∗i (X) = ui(X).

A.2. Existence of m.p.s. BNEs under primitive conditions.
Definition 3. a set A ⊆ Rd is upper if and only if its indicator function is non–decreasing, i.e., for any
x, y ∈ Rd, x ∈ A and x ≤ y imply y ∈ A, where x ≤ y means xi ≤ yi for i = 1, · · · , d.
Assumption PRD (Positive Regression Dependence). For any x ∈ SX and any upper set A ⊆ RI−1,
the conditional probability P (U−i ∈ A|X = x,Ui = ui) is non–decreasing in ui ∈ SUi|X=x.
Assumption SCP (Strategic Complement Payoffs). For any x ∈ SX and ui ∈ SUi|X=x, suppose
a−i ≤ a′−i, then πi(a−i, x) ≤ πi(a′−i, x).
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Lemma 6. Suppose assumptions R, PRD and SCP hold. For any x ∈ SX , there exists an m.p.s. BNE.
Proof. By Lemma 1, it suffices to show that assumption M holds. Fix x ∈ SX . Given an arbitrary
m.p.s. profile: for i = 1, · · · , I, δi(x, ui) = 1[ui ≤ ui(x)], where ui(·) is arbitrarily given. By
assumptions PR and SCP, and Lehmann (1955), for any ui < u′i in the support, we have
Eδ
[
πi(Y−i,X)|X = x,Ui = u′i
] ≤ Eδ [πi(Y−i,X)|X = x,Ui = ui] .
Thus, Eδ [πi(Y−i,X)|X = x,Ui = ui]− ui is a weakly decreasing function of ui. 
APPENDIX B. RATIONALIZATION
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1. Prove the “only if part” first: Proofs by contradiction. Let FY|X be
rationalized by M1, i.e., some S ∈ M1 can generate FY|X. Fix X = x and let equilibrium be
characterized by (u∗1(x), · · · , u∗I (x)). For some a ∈ A, w.l.o.g., a = (1, · · · , 1), suppose P(Y =
a|X = x) = 0 and P(Yi = ai|X = x) > 0 for all i. It follows that P(U1 ≤ u∗1(x), · · · ,UI ≤
u∗I (x)|X = x) = 0 and P(Ui ≤ u∗i (x)|X = x) > 0 for all i, which violates assumption R. Then
S 6∈ M1. Contradiction.
Proofs for the “if part”: Fix an arbitrary x ∈ SX . First, we assume P(Y = a|X = x) > 0 for all
a ∈ A, which will be relaxed later. Now we construct a structure inM1 that will lead to FY|X(·|x).
Let πi(a−i, x) = αi(x) for i = 1, · · · , I. Note that there is no strategic effect by construction and
assumption M is satisfied. Now we construct FU|X(·|x). Let FUi |X(·|x) be uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. So it suffices to construct the copula function CU|X(·|x) on [0, 1]I. We first construct CU|X(·|x)
on a finite sub–support: {E(Y1|X = x), 1} × · · · × {E(YI |X = x), 1}. Then we extend it to a proper
copula function with the full support [0, 1]I . Let CU|X(α1, · · · , αI |x) = E(∏pj=1Yi j |X = x) where
i1, · · · , ip are all the indexes such that αi j = E(Yi j|X = x); while other indexes have αk = 1. Because
P(Y = a|X = x) > 0 for all a ∈ A, CU|X(·|x) is strictly increasing in each index on the finite
sub–support. Thus it is straightforward that we can extend CU|X(·|x) to the whole support [0, 1]I
as a strictly increasing (on the support (0, 1]I) and smooth copula function. By construction, it is
straightforward that the constructed structure can generate FY|X(·|x).
When P(Y = a|X = x) = 0 for some a’s in A. By the condition in Proposition 1, the conditional
distribution of Y given X = x is degenerated in some indexes. W.l.o.g., let {1, · · · , k} be set of
indexes such that P(Yi = 1|X = x) = 0 or 1, and let {k+ 1, · · · , I} satisfy 0 < P(Yi = 1|X = x) < 1.
Then let again πi(a−i, x) = αi(x) for i = 1, · · · , I. For player i = k + 1, · · · , I, we can construct
a sub–copula function CUk+1,··· ,UI |X(·|x) as described above such that CUk+1,··· ,UI |X(·|x) is strictly
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increasing and smooth. Further, we can extend CUk+1,··· ,UI |X(·|x) to a proper copula function having
the full support [0, 1]I. Similarly, the constructed structure generates FY|X(·|x). 
B.2. Rationalizing All Probability Distributions. Suppose we replace assumption R with the fol-
lowing conditions in Reny (2011): For every x ∈ SX,
G.2. The distribution FUi|X(·|x) on SUi |X=x is atomless.
G.3. There is a countable subset S 0
Ui|X=x of SUi|X=x such that every set in SUi |X=x assigned
positive probability by FUi|X(·|x) contains two points between which lies a point in S 0Ui |X=x.
Note that it is straightforward that assumptions G.1 and G.4 through G.6 in Reny (2011) are
all satisfied in our discrete game because the action space A is finite and the conditional distri-
bution of U given X = x has a hypercube support in RI . Thus, the conclusion in Lemma 1
still holds (i.e., existence of an m.p.s. BNE) under assumptions G.2, G.3 and M. Moreover, let
M′1 ≡ {S : G.2, G.3 and M hold and a single m.p.s. BNE is played}. Then, we generalize Proposi-
tion 1.
Lemma 7. Any conditional distribution FY|X can be rationalized byM′1.
Proof. We prove by construction. Fix x. Let πi(a−i, x) = αi(x) for all i. Note that there is no strategic
effect by construction and assumption M is satisfied. Now we construct FU|X(·|x). Let [0, 1]I be the
support of the distribution and partition it into 2I disjoint events:
⊗I
i=1{[0, αi(x)), [αi(x), 1]} 23.
Further, we define a conditional distribution FU|X=x,U∈Bj as a uniform distribution on Bj, where Bj
is the j–th event in the partition of the support. Moreover, let P(U ∈ Bj|X = x) = P(Y = a(j)|X =
x)where a(j) ∈ A and satisfies ai(j) = 0 if the i–th argument of event Bj is [αi(x), 1], and ai(j) = 1 if
the i–th argument is [0, αi(x)). With such construction, the marginal distribution of Ui given X = x
is a uniform distribution on [0, 1] which satisfies assumptions G.2 and G.3. It can be verified that
the constructed structure leads to FY|X(·|x). 
B.3. Proof of Proposition 2.
23To have meaningful partition, it is understood that {[0, αi(x)), [αi(x), 1]} becomes {{0}, (0, 1]}when αi(x) =
0.
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Proof. We first show the "only if part”. Suppose that the distribution FY|X(·|·) rationalized byM1
is derived from S˜ = [π˜; F˜U|X ] ∈ M2 . Then
E
( p
∏
j=1
Yi j |X
)
= P
(
Yi1 = 1, · · · ,Yip = 1|X
)
= P
(
Ui1 ≤ u˜∗i1(X), · · · ,Uip ≤ u˜∗ip(X)|X
)
= C˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip
(
αi1(X), · · · , αip(X)
)
.
Similarly,
E
( p
∏
j=1
Yi j |αi1(X), · · · , αip(X)
)
= C˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip
(
αi1(X), · · · , αip(X)
)
.
Thus, we have condition R1. Further, R2 and R3 obtain by the properties of the copula function
C˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip .
Proofs for the “if part”. For any x ∈ SX , let π˜i(·, x) = αi(x). Let F˜Ui denote the CDF of uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. For all 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ip ≤ I, (αi1 , · · · , αip) ∈ Sαi1 (X),··· ,αip (X) and x ∈ SX,
define F˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip (·, · · · , ·) as follows: for each αi1 , · · · , αip ∈ Sαi1 (X),··· ,αip (X),
F˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip (αi1, · · · , αip) = E
[ p
∏
j=1
Yi j
∣∣αi1(X) = αi1, · · · , αip(X) = αip].
Thus, we define F˜U on the support {α : (αi1, · · · , αip) ∈ Sαi1 (X),··· ,αip (X); other αi j = 1}.
By Proposition 1, we have that F˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip ,Uk(αi1 , · · · , αip, αk) < F˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip (αi1 , · · · , αip) for any
k 6= ij, j = 1, · · · , p, αi j > 0 and αk < 1. Further, under conditions R2, R3, F˜U is strictly increasing
and continuously differentiable on {α : (αi1, · · · , αip) ∈ Sαi1 (X),··· ,αip (X); other αi j = 1}. Hence, we
can extend it to the whole support [0, 1]I as a proper distribution function such that it is strictly
increasing and continuously differentiable on [0, 1]I. The extended F˜U(·) will yield a positive and
continuous conditional Radon–Nikodym density on [0, 1]I.
By construction, [π˜; F˜U] ∈ M2. Fix X = x. The constructed structure [π˜; F˜U(·)] will generate the
given marginal distribution αi(x) for all i. Moreover, for any tuple {i1, · · · , ip} from {1, · · · , I},
P˜(Yi1 = 1, · · · ,Yip = 1|X = x) = F˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip
(
αi1(x), · · · , αip(x)
)
= E
[ p
∏
j=1
Yi j
∣∣αi1(X) = αi1(x), · · · , αip(X) = αip(x)] = E[ p∏
j=1
Yi j
∣∣X = x].
Because the tuple {i1, · · · , ip} is arbitrary, then [π˜, F˜U] generates the distribution FY|X(·|x). 
B.4. Proof of Proposition 3.
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Proof. The “only if part” follows directly from assumption I and the single equilibrium condition.
It suffices to show the “if part”.
Fix a distribution FY|X that satisfies the condition. Let F˜Ui |X = F˜Ui be a uniform distribution on
[0, 1] and F˜U|X = ∏Ii=1 F˜Ui . Moreover, let π˜i(·, x) = αi(x) for any x ∈ SX. By construction, [π˜; F˜U|X ]
satisfies assumptions R, M, E, and I. Hence, [π˜; F˜U|X] ∈ M3.
It suffices to show that the constructed structure [π˜; F˜U|X ] can generate FY|X. Fix x. By construc-
tion, we have that P˜(Yi = 1|X = x) = αi(x). Moreover, for any tuple {i1, · · · , ip} from {1, · · · , I},
P˜(Yi1 = 1, · · · ,Yip = 1|X = x) = F˜Ui1 ,··· ,Uip
(
αi1(x), · · · , αip(x)
)
=
p
∏
j=1
αi j(x) = P(Yi1 = 1, · · · ,Yip = 1|X = x).
Because the tuple {i1, · · · , ip} is arbitrary, then [π˜, F˜U|X] generates the distribution FY|X(·|x). 
APPENDIX C. IDENTIFICATION
C.1. Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. Our proof is an extension of the copula argument in Darsow et al. (1992). Fix X = x. By law
of iterated expectation,
P (Yi = 1;Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α)
= EUi [P (Yi = 1;Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α,Ui)]
=
∫ QUi(αi)
QUi(0)
P (Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α,Ui = ui) dFUi(ui)
=
∫ αi
0
P
[
Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α,Ui = QUi(vi)
]
dvi
=
∫ αi
0
P
[
Y−i = a−i|α−i(X) = α−i,Ui = QUi(vi)
]
dvi
where the second equality comes from assumption E and the fact that P[Yi = 1|α(X) = α,Ui ≤
QUi(αi)] = 1 and P[Yi = 1|α(X) = α,Ui > QUi(αi)] = 0, the third equality from a change–in–
variable (vi = FUi(ui)) in the integration, and the last step is because conditioning on α−i(X) is
equivalent to conditioning on u∗j (X) for all j 6= i, therefore, Y−i is (conditionally) independent of X
(and αi(X) as well) given α−i(X) by assumption E.
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Therefore, we have
∂P (Yi = 1;Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α)
∂αi
= P
[
Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α,Ui = QUi(αi)
]
.
Note that QUi(αi(x)) = u
∗
i (x). By assumption E, we then have
σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)) ≡ P [Y−i = a−i|X = x,Ui = u∗i (x)]
= P [Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α(x),Ui = u∗i (x)] =
∂P (Yi = 1;Y−i = a−i|α(X) = α)
∂αi
∣∣∣
α=α(x)
. 
C.2. Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. By the proof in Lemma 1 and assumption ER, we have: for all x ∈ SX such that αi(x) ∈ (0, 1),
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)σ∗−i
(
a−i|x, u∗i (x)
)
= QUi(αi(x)). (12)
It follows that
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)E
[
σ∗−i
(
a−i|X, u∗i (X))
)|Xi = xi, αi(X) = αi(x)] = QUi(αi(x)) (13)
The difference between (12) and (13) yields
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)× σ∗−i
(
a−i, x
)
= 0 (14)
where σ∗−i
(
a−i, x
) ≡ σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x))−E [σ∗−i(a−i|X, u∗i (X))|Xi = xi, αi(X) = αi(x)].
When xi is fixed, we can identify πi(·, xi) as coefficients by varying σ∗−i(a−i, x) through x−i.
Suppose Ri(xi) has rank 2I−1 − 1. Because ∑a−i∈A−i σ∗−i
(
a−i, x
)
= 0, πi(a−i, xi) equals the same
constant for all a−i ∈ A−i. By (12), we have πi(·, xi) = QUi(αi(x)). Therefore,Sαi(X)|Xi=xi has to be
a singleton {α†i }.
Next, suppose Ri(xi) has rank 2I−1 − 2. Then we can pick a vector π0i (·, xi) ∈ R2
I−1
such that
π0i (a−i, xi) 6= π0i (a′−i, xi) for some a−i, a′−i ∈ A−i, and π0i (·, xi) satisfy
∑
a−i∈A−i
π0i (a−i, xi)× σ∗−i
(
a−i, x
)
= 0.
Note that we also have ∑a−i∈A−i 1× σ∗−i
(
a−i, x
)
= 0. By linear algebra, πi can be written as
πi(·, xi) = ci(xi) + pi(xi)× π0i (·, xi)
where ci, pi : SXi → R. Hence, πi are identified up to location (ci) and scale (pi). 
48
C.3. Proof of Proposition 5. For the first half for the proposition, we show by contradiction. It is
straightforward that Sαi(X)|Xi=xi has to be a singleton if πi(·, xi) is constant on A−i.
We now show the identification of the sign of πi(ai, xi)− πi(a0i , xi). Let x, x′ ∈ SX|Xi=xi , α(x) =
α, α(x′) = α′, and w.l.o.g., α′i < αi. Then
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)σ∗−i
(
a−i|x′,QUi(αi)
)
< QUi(αi(x)) = ∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)σ∗−i
(
a−i|x,QUi(αi)
)
,
from which we have
pi(xi)× ∑
a−i∈A−i
π0i (a−i, xi)×
[
σ∗−i
(
a−i|x′,QUi(αi)
)− σ∗−i(a−i|x,QUi(αi))] < 0.
Thus we identify the sign of pi(xi). It follows that the sign of πi(a−i, xi) − πi(a′−i, xi) = pi(xi) ×[
π0i (a−i, xi)− π0i (a′−i, xi)
]
is also identified. 
C.4. Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. By (9) and assumption N, clearly πi(a−i, ·) is identified on C0i . Hence, it suffices to show that
the identification of πi(a−i, ·) on Cti implies its identification on Ct+1i . By Definition 2, it suffices to
consider xi ∈ Ct+1i /Cti .
Suppose that Case (ii) occurs, i.e. Ri(xi) has rank 2I−1 − 2 and there exists x′i ∈ Cti such that
Sαi(X)|Xi=xi
⋂
Sαi(X)|Xi=x′i
⋂
(0, 1) contains at least two different elements 0 < α′i < αi < 1. Let
x, x′ ∈ SX|Xi=xi , αi(x) = αi and αi(x′) = α′i. Because x′i ∈ Cti , then by assumption πi(·, x′i) are
identified. Then both QUi(αi) and QUi(α
′
i) are identified by (9). Further, because Ri(xi) has rank
2I−1 − 2, then by Lemma 3, πi(·, xi) is identified up to location and scale, i.e. ∃ ci(xi), pi(xi) ∈ R
and a known vector π0i (·, xi) ∈ R2
I−1
, such that πi(·, xi) = ci(x) + pi(x) × π0i (·, xi). Moreover,
because αi, α′i ∈ Sαi(X)|Xi=xi
⋂
(0, 1), then we have
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)× σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)) = QUi(αi),
∑
a−i∈A−i
πi(a−i, xi)× σ∗−i(a−i|x′, u∗i (x′)) = QUi(α′i).
It follows that
ci(xi) + pi(xi)× ∑
a−i∈A−i
π0i (a−i, xi)× σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)) = QUi(αi),
ci(xi) + pi(xi)× ∑
a−i∈A−i
π0i (a−i, xi)× σ∗−i(a−i|x′, u∗i (x′)) = QUi(α′i).
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Note that QUi(αi), QUi(α
′
i), π
0
i (·, xi), σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)) and σ∗−i(a−i|x′, u∗i (x′)) are all known terms.
Because QUi(α
′
i) < QUi(αi), the determinant of the equation system cannot be zero. Then we can
identify ci(xi) and pi(xi) from the above two equations. Therefore, πi(·, xi) are identified.
Suppose that Case (iii) occurs, i.e. Ri(xi) has rank 2I−1 − 1 and there exists x′i ∈ Cti such that
Sαi(X)|Xi=xi ⊆ Sαi(X)|Xi=x′i
⋂
(0, 1). By Lemma 3, πi(·, xi) is identified by QUi(αi), which is known
since Sαi(X)|Xi=xi ⊆ Sαi(X)|Xi=x′i
⋂
(0, 1). 
APPENDIX D. EXTENSIONS
D.1. Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. First, we construct a structure S˜ ∈ M2 such that (1) S˜ has the marginal quantile functions(
Q˜U1 , · · · , Q˜UI
)
; (2) C˜U(·) = CU(·) on [0, 1]I; (3) for any x ∈ SX , i, and a−i ∈ A−i, let π˜i(a−i, x) =
Q˜Ui (E(Yi|X = x)). By construction, it is straightforward that assumptions R, M and E are satisfied.
Now it suffices to verify the observational equivalence between S˜ and S. Fix x ∈ SX . Note that
in the structure S˜ there is no strategic effects, then the equilibrium is: 1
{
ui ≤ Q˜Ui (E(Yi|X = x))
}
for i = 1, · · · , I. Here we only verify the observational equivalence for action profile (1, · · · , 1) and
the proofs for other action profiles follow similarly:
P˜(Y1 = 1; · · · ;YI = 1|X = x) = C˜U (E(Y|X = x))
= CU (E(Y|X = x)) = P(Y1 = 1; · · · ;YI = 1|X = x). 
D.2. Proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. It is straightforward that π ∈ ΘI({QUi}Ii=1,CU). For sharpness, it suffices to show that for
any π˜ ∈ ΘI({Q˜Ui}Ii=1, C˜U), then S˜ ≡ (π˜, {Q˜Ui}Ii=1, C˜U), which belongs toM2 by the definition of
ΘI({Q˜Ui}Ii=1, C˜U), is observationally equivalent to the underlying structure S ≡ (π, {QUi}Ii=1,CU).
Fix X = x. It suffices to verify that δ∗ =
(
1
{
u1 ≤ Q˜U1(α1(x))
}
, · · · , 1{uI ≤ Q˜UI (αI(x))}) is a
BNE solution for the constructed structure. Because C˜U ∈ CI and by the proof for Lemma 2,
P˜δ∗
{
Y−i = a−i|X = x,Ui = Q˜Ui(αi(x))
}
= σ∗−i(a−i|x, u∗i (x)).
Then, by the conditions in the definition of ΘI({Q˜Ui}Ii=1, C˜U), 1
{
ui ≤ Q˜Ui(αi(x))
}
is the best re-
sponse to δ∗−i. Thus δ
∗ is a BNE. 
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